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Abstract
We show that, in a Bayesian game, a Bayesian strategy map profile is a Bayesian Nash Equi-
librium independent of any prior if and only if the Bayesian strategy map profile, evaluated at
any type profile, is the Nash equilibrium of the so-called local deterministic game corresponding
to that type profile. We call such a Bayesian game, desired in particular in mechanism design
when the prior is unknown, type-regular. We then show that an m-dimensional n-agent Bayesian
game whose utilities are linearly dependent on the types of the agents is equivalent, following
a normalisation of the type space of each agent into the (m − 1)-simplex, to a simultaneous
competition in mn so-called basic n-agent games. If the game is own-type-linear, i.e., the utility
of each agent only depends linearly on its own type, then the Bayesian game is equivalent to
a simultaneous competition in m basic n-agent games, called a multi-game. We then prove
that an own-type-linear Bayesian game is type-regular if it is type-regular on the vertices of the
(m− 1)-simplex, a result which provides a large class of type-regular Bayesian maps.
The class of m-dimensional own-type-linear Bayesian games can model, via their equivalence
with multi-games, simultaneous decision-making in m different environments. We show that a
two dimensional own-type-linear Bayesian game can be used to give a new model of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma in which the prosocial tendencies of the agents are considered as their types and the
two agents play simultaneously in the PD as well as in a prosocial game. This leads to a type-
regular Bayesian game which is proposed as a way of addressing the prosocial tendencies of
the agents and the social payoff for cooperation. Similarly, we present a new two dimensional
Bayesian model of the Trust game in which the type of the two agents reflect their prosocial
tendency or trustfulness, which leads to more reasonable Nash equilibria. We finally consider
an example of such multi-environment decision making in production by several companies in
multi-markets.
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1 Introduction
Von Neumann and Morgentern originally modelled the behavior of rational agents in which agents
make independent decisions in order to maximize their utilities, payoffs or self-interests in a single
environment or economy [42]. The notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) has become the key concept in
game theory since Nash’s celebrated proof of existence of a mixed NE for all finite games [32]. A
similar notion of Bayesian NE is also at the basis of games with incomplete information as shown
by Harsanyi [21].
In a game with incomplete information, each agent may have some private information about
its strategy set or its payoff which is unknown to the other agents. Harsanyi considered this private
information as a set of types for each agent. It is assumed that agents have some belief or prior
about other agents’ private information, which can be captured by a probability distribution over
the types of all agents. Since each agent’s choice of strategy depends on its type, one can consider
an expanded game in which a Bayesian strategy for an agent is given by a function that takes its
types to its choice of actions in the underlying game. Knowing the joint probability distribution of
the types, each agent can compute its expected payoff given its own type. This leads to a solution
concept of equilibrium that is called pure or mixed Bayesian NE [19, p. 215]; see Section 2.
The first part of this paper is focused on Bayesian games with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that
is independent of any prior. An important area of application of such games is in mechanism design.
Auctions and mechanisms are incomplete information games in which the outcome can be described
by the standard equilibrium concept in which a prior assumption is necessary. To learn the prior,
a market analysis can be performed, for example, by hiring a marketing firm to survey the market
and determine distributional estimates of agent preferences. This process is quite reasonable in
large markets. In contrast, if there are only a few firms in the market for a product, the sample size
would hardly be enough for estimating the distribution for agents’ values [23, Chapter 5]. A prior-
independent approach to Bayesian game theory means that although there exist prior distributions
from which the agents’ values are drawn, the mechanism designer has no knowledge of these priors
[16].
A prior-independent mechanism would be parameterized neither by the distribution on agent
preference nor by the capacity that governs the agents’ utility functions. Based on their results
in [18], the authors argue that it may be possible to develop a general theory for prior-independent
mechanisms for risk-averse agents, although this theory would look different from the existing
theory of algorithmic mechanism design.
Later in the paper, we examine multi-dimensional Bayesian games with linear utilities. Multi-
dimensional Bayesian games, in which the type of each agent is a real vector, have been studied
by Krishna and Perry in the context of multiple object auctions [28]. This class includes all
combinatorial auction problems [30]. Common examples include multi-item environments where
an agent has different values for each item [22]: for example, a home buyer may have distinct values
for different houses on the market, an Internet user may have distinct values for various qualities
of service, and an advertiser on an Internet search engine may value traffic for search phrase
mortgage higher than that for loan [23, Chapter 7]. The challenge posed by multi-dimensional
private information is that multi-dimensional type spaces can be large, may be analytically or
computationally intractable [22].
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Athey’s result that a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium exists whenever a Bayesian game
satisfies the so-called single crossing condition [2] has been extended, from one-dimensional type
and action spaces, to the setting in which type and action spaces are multidimensional and only
partially ordered [31, 41, 38]. In [37], Bayesian games with multi-dimensional types where a utility
of an agent depends only on the actions performed by others and not on their type and each agent
draws its type independently from a commonly known continuous distribution have been studied.
The assumption of linear utilities is at the basis of the classical Cournot competition of firms,
which has been widely used to model the economy [15]. It has been also used recently in linear
exchange economies [7], for which uniqueness of the equilibrium under the linear assumption and
the unique utility level at equilibrium were established in [8]. In addition, there is a well-known
linear utility representation for a large class of preference relations, i.e., those that are translation
invariant and semi-continuous at some point on any finite dimensional Euclidean space [11, 40].
In this paper, we ask under what conditions a Bayesian game has a prior independent Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. We show that a Bayesian strategy map profile, i.e., an assignment of a mixed
NE to every type of every agent, is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium independent of any prior if and
only if the Bayesian strategy map, evaluated at any type profile, is the NE of the local game
corresponding to that type profile. We accordingly call a Bayesian game with a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium independent of any prior a type-regular Bayesian game.
We then examine the linear class of multi-dimensional n-agent Bayesian games, in which the
type space of each agent is a non-zero real vector with, say, m non-negative components, and
the utilities of each agent depends linearly on the types of the agents. We show that, following a
normalisation of the type space of each agent into the (m−1)-dimensional simplex, such a Bayesian
game is equivalent to a simultaneous competition by the agents in mn so-called basic n-agent games,
i.e., one basic game for each type component of the n agents. In case, the utility of each agent only
depends linearly on its own type, the Bayesian game is equivalent to simultaneous competition in
m basic n-agent games, which we call a multi-game.
We then prove, using the equivalence with multi-games, that an own-type-linear Bayesian game
is type-regular if it is type-regular on the vertices of the (m − 1)-simplex. This provides a large
class of type-regular Bayesian games and thus gives a scheme for designing games with a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium independent of any prior.
Multi-games, as an equivalent representation of own-type-linear multi-dimensional Bayesian
games, have some similarities and yet some basic differences with polymatrix games [43], one of
several well-studied classes of compactly represented games, which also include graphical games [26],
hypergraphical game [36], and graphical multi-hypermatrix games [33]. It is useful to recall that a
2-agent Bayesian game with a finite number of types can be represented by a polymatrix game [24].
In a polymatrix game, every agent plays the same strategy in every 2-agent subgame, and its utility
is the sum of its subgame utilities. In a MG, however, the utility of each agent in any local game,
i.e, for any type profile, is a weighted sum of its n-agent basic game utilities where the weights,
considered as private information, are given by the components of the agent’s type.
The equivalence with multi-games show us that m-dimensional own-type-linear Bayesian games
can model simultaneous decision-making by n agents in m different environments, i.e., one environ-
ment per dimension. Two different kinds of examples for this form of simultaneous decision-making
are considered in this paper: (i) In production by several companies in multi-markets. (ii) In human
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decision making in which as well as material payoffs there are social and moral consequences or
payoffs for the actions of the agents, as in the Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Trust game.
In the economic literature, competition in multi-markets have been examined in the context of
the Cournot model. In [10], Bulow et al. provide a numerical example of Cournot markets in which
two firms sell in one market and one of them is a monopolist in a second market. In more recent
years, several authors have examined a network approach to Cournot competition [6, 1, 1]. In the
multi-game approach, different markets are considered as independent of each other with different
rates of return and the companies allocate different proportions of their investment, considered as
their types, to these markets.
A classic benchmark for modeling human decision making when self-interests are at stake is
provided by the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) [34, 39] in which defection by both agents represents
the NE despite the fact that mutual cooperation produces greater reward. This outcome would be
consistent with the basic tenet of game theory to maximise self-interests. However, when confronted
with the choice to cooperate or defect, human beings not only consider their material score, but also
the social and moral implications of their individual decisions, and the consequent social and moral
payoffs. This view is supported in game theory by Gintis [20, Chapter 1] and in neuroscience by
the finding that decision making has a significant and substantial emotional component [4, 29]. In
fact, in recent years, there have been experiments on the PD with real people that corroborate this
argument empirically. Khadjavi and Lange present an experiment to compare female prison inmates
and students in a simultaneous and an iterated PD [27]. In the simultaneous PD, the cooperation
rate among inmates exceeded the rate of cooperating students. The authors have concluded that
a similar and significant fraction of inmates and students hold social preferences. Brosig provides
findings from a face-to-face experiment that used the PD to analyse whether individuals who
possess a willingness to cooperate can credibly signal it and whether it is recognisable by the
partner [9]. Results revealed that both capabilities, signaling and recognising, depend upon the
individual’s propensity to cooperate. There is a vast literature on non-cooperative games to account
for altruistic behaviour; see the literature review in [12] which addresses the issue by considering an
altruistic extension of the pay-offs of the agents who are then provided with altruistic coefficients
that can be considered as their types. This model however cannot account for the different social
values of the agents’ different choices of actions.
We show that a two dimensional own-type-linear Bayesian game, equivalent to a double game,
i.e., with two basic games, can be used to give a new Bayesian model of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
in which the prosocial preferences of the agents are considered as their types. In this model, one
dimension or game is represented by the PD and the other dimension is given by a social game
which encourages cooperation and allows the social or moral payoffs of the agents’ actions to be
also taken into account in the decision making.
In more recent years, the so-called Trust game with two agents and an experimenter has been
proposed to measure trust in human economic behaviour [5]. Initially the two agents are given an
equal amount of money. Then in stage one, the first agent is asked to send some of her money to
the experimenter who triples it and sends the tripled amount to the second agent. In stage two,
the second agents is asked to send some of the money she has received by the experimenter to
the first agent. The NE in the Trust game stipulates that the first agent sends no money to the
experimenter and the second agent also sends no money back to the first agent; see Subsection 5.2.
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However, in practice, as in the PD, human agents deviate from the NE of the Trust game as
reported in a meta-analysis of 162 replications of the game involving more than 23,000 partici-
pants [25], in which on average the sender does send some money to the receiver and the receiver
does return some of the money received to the sender. An explanation for this deviation has been
proposed by evolutionary psychology: Evolutionary models predict the emergence of trust because
it maximises genetic fitness [5]. We use a two dimensional staged Bayesian game or double game
in which one game is the Trust game and the other game is a social or conscience game and the
prosocial tendencies of the agents are represented by their types. Depending on the receiver’s be-
lief, we obtain different subgame perfect Nash equilibria for the double game that include strategy
profiles in which both the sender and the receiver forward some money to each other.
2 Prior independent Bayesian equilibria
We first recall the definition of a general class of Bayesian games as in [19, p. 215]. A Bayesian
game G is a game in strategic form with incomplete information which has the following structure:
G =
〈
I, (Ai,Θi, ui)i∈I , p(·)
〉
where I = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents, Ai is agent i’s action set, Θi
is agent i’s type space, and ui :
∏
i∈I Ai×
∏
i∈I Θi → R is agent i’s payoff. The agents’ type profile
(θ1, . . . , θn)
t ∈ ∏i∈I Θi is drawn from a given joint probability distribution p(θ1, . . . , θn). For any
θi ∈ Θi, the function p(·|θi) specifies a conditional probability distribution over Θ−i representing
what agent i believes about the types of the other agents if its own type were θi.
The type space of the game is defined as Θ :=
∏
i∈I Θi. The pure strategy map space for agent
i ∈ I is the set SΘii = {si(·) : Θi → Ai} so that
∏
i∈I S
Θi
i represents the space of all strategy map
profiles. For a strategy map profile (si(·), s−i(·)) ∈ SΘii × SΘ−i−i , the expected utility of agent i ∈ I
is
ui(si(·), s−i(·)) =
∑
θi∈Θi
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i|θi)ui
(
si(θi), s−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i
)
.
Recall that a strategy map profile (s1(·), . . . , sn(·)) is a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) if
for each agent i ∈ I and s′i(·) ∈ SΘii , we have ui
(
si(·), s−i(·)
) ≥ ui(s′i(·), s−i(·)) [19, p. 215]. For
discrete type spaces, this is equivalent to
si(θi) ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
∑
θ−i∈Θi
pi(θ−i|θi)ui
(
ai, s−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i
)
,
for each i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi. Let ∆(Ai) =
{
σi(·) : Ai → [0, 1]|
∑
ai∈Ai σi(ai) = 1
}
be the set of mixed
actions for agent i ∈ I. By considering the normal form [19, p. 3] of G, the mixed map strategy
space for G is
{
σi(·) : Θi → ∆(Ai)
}
. The notion of mixed Bayesian mixed NE is defined similar to
pure BNE. From now on, we assume a BNE is a mixed Bayesian mixed NE which may be pure.
Definition 1. The restriction of a Bayesian game G to a given type profile (θ1, . . . , θn)
t ∈ Θ is
denoted by G(θ1,...,θn) and is called the local game for G at (θ1, . . . , θn).
In general, any BNE in games with incomplete information requires the prior distribution to be
common knowledge. In many cases, however, the prior distribution may not be known, a situation
that for example can occur in mechanism design [23, 16, 18] . In these cases, it is therefore desirable
to relax this assumption. We now seek necessary and sufficient conditions for a Bayesian game to
have a BNE that is independent of any prior.
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Theorem 1. Given a Bayesian game G, the strategy map profile (σ1(·), . . . , σn(·)) is a BNE for all
priors if and only if the strategy profile
(
σ1(θ1), . . . , σn(θn)
)
is a NE for the local game G(θ1,...,θn)
for all (θ1, . . . , θn)
t ∈ Θ.
Proof. We present the proof for the case when all agents have finite type spaces. The case of infinite
type spaces, which uses integrals instead of sums to evaluate the payoffs, is entirely similar. First,
assume (σ1(·), . . . , σn(·)) is a BNE for all prior p. Hence, for each i ∈ I and for any given θi ∈ Θi,
we have ∑
θ′−i∈Θ−i
p(θ′−i|θi)ui(σi(θi), σ−i(θ′−i), θi, θ′−i) ≥
∑
θ′−i∈Θ−i
p(θ′−i|θi)ui(ai, σ−i(θ′−i), θi, θ′−i) (1)
for each ai ∈ Ai and all priors p. For any given θ−i ∈ Θ−i, define the conditional probability
distribution: p(θ′−i|θi) = 1 if θ′−i = θ−i and 0 otherwise. Using this prior p in (1), we deduce
ui(σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) ≥ ui(ai, σ−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) for each ai ∈ Ai. Thus, (σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i)) is a
NE for the local game G(θi,θ−i).
Now, suppose the strategy profile
(
σ1(θ1), . . . , σn(θn)
)
is a NE for the local game G(θ1,...,θn) for
(θ1, . . . , θn)
t ∈ Θ. Thus, for each agent i ∈ I:
ui(σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) ≥ ui(ai, σ−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) (2)
for each ai ∈ Ai. Let p be any joint probability distribution on Θ. From Inequality (2), we obtain:
p(θ−i|θi)ui(σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) ≥ p(θ−i|θi)ui(ai, σ−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) for each ai ∈ Ai. Therefore,
summing over θ−i ∈ Θ−i, we conclude:∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
p(θ−i|θi)ui(σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) ≥
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
p(θ−i|θi)ui(ai, σ−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)
for each ai ∈ Ai which shows that (σi(·), σ−i(·)) is a BNE for the prior p. 
Theorem 1 motivates the following definition. Let the projection map pii : Θ → Θi, for each
i ∈ I, be given by pii(θ1, . . . , θn) = θi.
Definition 2. A Bayesian game G is type-regular on Θ′ ⊆ Θ if for each agent i ∈ I there exists a
function σ∗i (·) : pii(Θ′) → ∆(Ai) such that the strategy profile
(
σ∗1(θ1), . . . , σ∗n(θn)
)
is a NE for the
local game G(θ1,...,θn) whenever (θ1, . . . , θn)
t ∈ Θ′. If G is type-regular on Θ then G is simply called
type-regular and the associated strategy map profile and BNE are also called type-regular.
Intuitively, a Bayesian game G is type-regular on Θ′ if for each agent and a given type component
for it, selected from the set Θ′, the agent can select an action, dependent only on the given type
component, such that for each type profile in Θ′ the resulting action profile is a NE for the local
game specified by that type profile. Note from the definition that if G is type-regular on Θ′ ⊆ Θ,
then it is type-regular on any subset of Θ′. Theorem 1 can be thus reformulated: a Bayesian game
has a prior independent BNE iff it is type-regular.
3 Linear multi-dimensional Bayesian games
We consider the standard Cartesian coordinate system in Rm for a given integer m > 1 with the
standard basis vectors vj = (vj1, . . . , vjm)
t ∈ Rm, where vjr = 1 for j = r and 0 otherwise. Let
V = {vj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and R+ denote the set of nonnegative real numbers.
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Definition 3. A Bayesian game G is multidimensional if the type of each agent is a vector in
Rm+ \ {0}. A multidimensional Bayesian game is type-linear if the utility of each agent depends
linearly on the types of all agents. A linear Bayesian game is own-type-linear if the utility of each
agent only depends on its own type.
We will now show that an m-dimensional n-agent Bayesian game is equivalent to a simultaneous
competition by the n agents in m basic n-agent games. Let Σm−1 = {x ∈ Rm+ :
∑m
i=1 xi = 1} be
the (m − 1)-dimensional simplex in Rm. The following notion of a multi-game is similar to that
introduced in [17].
Definition 4. A multi-game G =
〈
I, J, {Gj}j∈J , {Ai}i∈I , {Θi}i∈I , {uij}i∈I,j∈J , p(·)
〉
is an own-
type-linear Bayesian game given by
〈
I, (Ai,Θi, ui)i∈I , p(·)
〉
with the following conditions:
(1) Agent i’s type space Θi ⊆ Σm−1 for i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}.
(2) There is a set of n-agent basic games Gj where j ∈ J = {1, . . . ,m} with action space Ai and
payoff function uij for agent i ∈ I.
(3) Agent i’s payoff for the strategy profile (si, s−i) and type profile (θi, θ−i) is given by
ui(si, s−i, θi, θ−i) =
∑
j∈J
uij(si, s−i)θij .
Multi-games (MG) can be seen to have some similarities and yet some basic differences with
polymatrix games as pointed out in the Introduction. We now generalise the notion of a multi-game
so that the utility of each agent depends on the types of all agents. A generalized multi-game
G =
〈
I, J, {Gkj}k∈I,j∈J , {Ai}i∈I , {Θi}i∈I , {uikj}i,k∈I,j∈J , p(·)
〉
is a type-linear Bayesian game given by
〈
I, (Ai,Θi, ui)i∈I , p(·)
〉
which satisfies items (1) and (2) of
Definition 4 with item (3) replaced by the following item:
(3’) Agent i’s payoff for the strategy profile (si, s−i) and type profile (θi, θ−i) is given by
ui(si, s−i, θi, θ−i) =
∑
k∈I,j∈J
uikj(si, s−i)θkj .
We can now show the following result.
Theorem 2. Suppose G is a type-linear n-agent Bayesian game such that for each agent i ∈ I the
type space Θi ⊆ R+m \ {0}, then G is equivalent with a generalized MG.
Proof. Let G =
〈
I, (Ai,Θi, ui)i∈I , p(·)
〉
. Since θi 6= 0 for θi ∈ Θi for each agent i ∈ I, we can
divide each vector θi ∈ Θi by
∑
j∈J θij > 0 and assume that Θi ⊆ Σm−1 for i ∈ I. Since G is
type-linear, for i ∈ I and (si, s−i) ∈ Ai × A−i, there exists Lik(si, s−i) ∈ Rm, for k ∈ I, such that
ui(si, s−i, θ1, . . . , θn) =
∑
k∈I(Lik(si, s−i))
tθk. Consider the generalised MG given by
Gˆ =
〈
I, J, {Gkj}k∈I,j∈J , {Θi}i∈I , {Ai}i∈I , {uˆikj}i,k∈I,j∈J , p(·)
〉
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such that agent i’s utility function for the basic game Gkj is given by uˆikj(si, s−i) = (Lik(si, s−i))j
for i ∈ I and j ∈ J . Agent i’s utility in Gˆ is now seen to be that in G as follows:
uˆi(si, s−i, θi, θ−i) =
∑
k∈I
∑
j∈J
uˆikj(si, s−i)θkj =
∑
k∈I
∑
j∈J
(Lik(si, s−i))jθkj = ui(si, s−i, θ1, . . . , θn).

Corollary 1. Suppose G is an own-type-linear n-agent Bayesian game such that the type space
Θi ⊆ R+m \ {0} for each i ∈ I, then G is equivalent with a MG.
Proof. Let Gˆ =
〈
I, J, {Gj}j∈J , {Θi}i∈I , {Ai}i∈I , {uˆij}i∈I,j∈J , p(·)
〉
be a MG such that agent i’s
utility function for the basic game Gj is given by uˆij = uˆiij for each i ∈ I, j ∈ J , where uˆiij is as
in the proof of Theorem 2 (with uˆikj = 0 for k 6= i). 
Note that the normalisation in the proof of Theorem 2 implies that any type θi ∈ Θi satisfies∑m
j=1 θij = 1. For a eneralised multi-game, this means that the type component θij ≥ 0 is the
proportion of the agent i’s type allocated to the basic game Gij . For a multi-game, this means that
the type component θij ≥ 0 is the proportion of the agent i’s type allocated to the basic game Gj .
Multi-games, equivalently own-type-linear Bayesian games, can therefore model the behaviour
of a finite number of rational agents who play in a number of different environments simultaneously,
where each environment is represented by a basic game and the resources of each agent are allocated
with varying proportions, as private information, to these basic games.
4 Regular Bayesian Nash equilibrium
By Theorem 1, a Bayesian game has a BNE for all prior if and only if it is type-regular. In this
section, we investigate a necessary and sufficient condition for type-regularity of a type-linear multi-
dimensional Bayesian game G. By normalization, we can assume that Θi ⊂ Σm−1. Since utility
functions are linear on types, we can extended these utility functions to Σm−1. Therefore, without
loss of generality, from now on, we assume Θi = Σ
m−1. Thus, the type space is Θ =
(
Σm−1
)n
and
its boundary is given by
⋃
i∈I Θi × V n−1, where for clarity we have written agent i’s type space as
Θi rather than Σ
m−1 and V , recall, is the set of vertices of Σm−1. Thus, V n is the set of vertices
of Θ. We aim to show that an own-type-linear Bayesian game G is type-regular if and only if G is
type-regular on V n. The proofs of the following two lemmas are given in Section 6.
Lemma 1. If an own-type-linear Bayesian game G is type-regular on V × {θ−i} for a given i ∈ I
and θ−i ∈ Θ−i, then it is type-regular on Θi × {θ−i}.
Corollary 2. Suppose an own-type-linear Bayesian game is type-regular on V × {θ−i} for a given
i ∈ I and θ−i ∈ Θ−i with σ∗i (·) : V → ∆(Ai) and σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) as a witness for type-regularity.
Then the extended function σ∗i (·) : Θi → ∆(Ai) with σ∗i (θi) =
∑m
j=1 θijσ
∗
i (vj) induces type-regularity
on Θi × {θ−i} .
Recall that V n is the set of vertices of the type space Θ.
Lemma 2. If an own-type-linear Bayesian game G is type-regular on V n, then G is type-regular
on the boundary
⋃
i∈I Θi × V n−1 of the type space Θ.
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Theorem 3. If an own-type-linear Bayesian game is type-regular on the boundary
⋃
i∈I Θi×V n−1
of the type space Θ, then it is type-regular.
Proof. By Theorem 1, we can assume G is a type-regular multi-game on
⋃
i∈I Θi×V n−1. Then for
each i ∈ I, there exists σ∗i : Θi → ∆(Ai) and σ∗−i : V n−1 → ∆(A−i) such that (σ∗i (θi), σ∗−i(θ−i)) is
a NE for G(θi,θ−i) for each (θi, θ−i) ∈ Θi × V n−1. We claim that (σ∗1(θ1), . . . , σ∗n(θn)) is a NE for
G(θ1,...,θn) for each (θ1, . . . , θn)
t ∈ Θ. For each agent i ∈ I, we have
ui
(
σ∗i (θi), σ
∗
−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i
)
=
m∑
j=1
θijui
(
σ∗i (θi), σ
∗
−i(θ−i), vj , θ−i
)
Since (σ∗i (θi), σ
∗
−i(θ−i)) is a NE for the local game G(vj1 ,...,vji−1 ,θi,vji+1 ,...,vjn ) we have
m∑
j=1
θijui
(
σ∗i (θ
j
i ), σ
∗
−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i
) ≥ m∑
j=1
θijui
(
σ′i, σ
∗
−i(θ−i), vj , θ−i
)
,
for each σ′i ∈ ∆(Ai). Hence ui
(
σ∗i (θi), σ
∗
−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i
) ≥ ui(σ′i, σ∗−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) which implies that
G is type-regular. 
From Lemma 2 and Theorem 3, we obtain:
Corollary 3. If an own-type-linear Bayesian game G is type-regular on V n, then it is type-regular
and thus has a prior independent BNE.
Note that in Corollary 3, the agents’ type spaces can be infinite or continuous and we will still
have a prior independent BNE. Corollary 3 provides a method to construct type-regular Bayesian
games by ensuring that it is type-regular on V n as we will see in the next two sections.
5 Examples of decision making in multi-environments
In Section 6, we indicate how own-type-linear Bayesian games, equivalently, multi-games, can be
used to model production by several companies in multi-markets. In this section, we show how
multi-games can be used to create new two dimensional Bayesian models for well-known the PD
and the Trust game.
A multi-game is called a Double Game (DG) if m = 2. In a DG, it is convenient to write the
type (θi1, θi2) of agent i as θi := θi2 with θi1 = 1− θi2 = 1− θi. Thus, for an n-agent DG we have
Θi ⊆ [0, 1] and Θ =
∏
i∈I Θi = [0, 1]
n with the boundary of Θ given by {0, 1}n.
5.1 A Double Game for Prisoner’s Dilemma
As argued in the Introduction, in many circumstances, human beings consider not only their
material score, but also the social payoffs of any decision they make. This can be modelled by
allowing agents to engage simultaneously in a social game and a standard material game for their
utilities. We will show this for the case of the PD.
Consider the standard PD with the payoffs as given in Table 1 (left) with t > r > p > s and
r > (t + s)/2 as in [3]. The social game (SG) encourages cooperation and discourages defection,
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C D
C (r, r) (s, t)
D (t, s) (p, p)
C D
C (y, y) (y, z)
D (z, y) (z, z)
Table 1: Payoff metrics for PD (left) and SG (right)
as cooperating is usually considered to be the right ethical and moral choice when interacting with
others in social dilemmas. This can be done in different ways which correspond to different types
of payoff matrices. Here, we will only consider the case in which SG encourages cooperation and
discourages defection for each agent, independently of the action chosen by the other agent. We
present the normal form and the mathematical formulation of the SG as follows. Assume that the
competing participants in the SG are agents 1 and 2. Each of them can select C or D. When they
have both made their choice, the payoffs assigned to them are calculated according to Table 1(right).
As in [35], let y > z = s, i.e., the SG encourages cooperation and the least payoff of the PD and
SG are taken to be the same. The strategy profiles (D,D) and (C,C) are NEs for PD and SG,
respectively. Consider a DG with basic games PD and SG. The type θi ∈ [0, 1] of agent i = 1, 2
is their prosocial coefficient, with θi = 0 reflecting complete selfishness while θi = 1 indicating
maximum pro-sociability. It is easy to see that the DG is type-regular on {0, 1}2. By Corollary 3,
it is type-regular with type-regularity witness σ∗i (·) : Θi → ∆({D,C}) with σ∗i (θi) = (1−θi)D+θiC
for each agent i = 1, 2. By Theorem 1, (σ∗1(·), σ∗2(·)) is a BNE for all priors.
This framework for considering the PD with a SG, we propose, is a way to model real-life situa-
tions, as, in general, decisions based on prosocial or moral incentives and beliefs do not necessarily
bring the highest material benefits.
5.2 A Double Game for Trust Game
Trust game is a 2-agent stage game G1 in which A1 = [0, 1], A2 = {x|3y ≥ x, y ∈ A1} and
u1(y, x) = x − y, u2(y, x) = 3y − x for y ∈ A1 and x ∈ A2. By backward induction, when the
first agent plays first, (0, 0) is the NE. If, for the sake of illustration, we restrict agent 1’s actions
to A′1 = {0, 1}, then Figure 1 shows the branches of the stage game where the two agents are
named ag1 and ag2, respectively. As usual, the label on each edge is the action taken by the agent
on the node above and udder each leaf, the first number is the payoff of agent 1 for the branch
corresponding to the leaf and the second number is agent 2’s payoff.
Under the standard economic assumption of rational self-interest, the predicted actions of the
first agent in Trust game will be to send nothing, and any behaviour that deviates from this self-
interest is viewed as irrational. Since in actual experiments, individuals significantly deviate from
this NE, we argue that, as well as their material interest, they seek to build or protect their social
reputation or their own ethical and prosocial values. We thus propose to develop a more realistic
model of trust in economic behaviour by using a DG which includes Trust game above and a second
social or conscience game, which is very basically formulated here, a follows.
Let G1 be Trust game as described above and let G2 be the associated conscience or social
game in which A1 = [0, 1], A2 = {x ≥ 0|3y ≥ x, y ∈ A1} and u12(y, x) = y and u22(y, x) = x − 2y
for y ∈ A1 and x ∈ A2. The social payoff of agent 1 in sending amount y to agent 2 is considered
as the amount y itself. If agent 2 receives 3y as a result of agent 1 sending amount y, it is only
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0 −1
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0
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1
1
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0
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−1
1
0
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G2
Figure 1: Trust Game (G1), Social Game (G2).
fair that the increment namely 2y be divided equally between the two agents. This stipulates the
base line that agent 2 sends amount 2y to agent 1 so that each would have gained amount y. Thus,
the social payoff to agent 2 is taken as the linear function x − 2y, which is positive or negative
depending on whether more than or less than 2y is sent back by agent 2. By backward induction,
(1, 3) is the NE for G2. If again, we restrict agent 1’s actions to A
′
1 = {0, 1}, then Figure 1 shows
the branches of the stage game.
Consider a double game G with basic games G1 and G2 where A1 = [0, 1], A2 = {x ≥ 0|3y ≥
x, y ∈ A1}, Θ1 = {1/4} and Θ2 = {0, 2/3}. Therefore, in our model, the first agent is relatively
selfish with prosocial coefficient or type 1/4, whereas the second agent can either be completely
selfish, with type 0, or relatively prosocial with type 2/3. We have u1(y, x, 1/4, 2/3) = 3x/4− y/2
and u2(y, x, 1/4, 2/3) = x/3− y/3. Thus, we obtain:
arg max
x
u2(y, x, 1/4, 2/3) = {3y}, arg max
x
u2(y, x, 1/4, 0) = {0}.
Hence, let
s2(θ2) =
{
0 θ2 = 0
3y θ2 = 2/3
We have u1(y, 0, 1/4, θ2) = −y/2 and u1(y, 3y, 1/4, θ2) = 7y/4. Let conditional probability distri-
bution p(2/3|1/4) = p0 and p(0|1/4) = 1− p0. As a result,∑
θ2∈Θ2
p(θ2|1/4)u1(y, s2(θ2), 1/4, θ2) = p0(−9y/4) + 7y/4.
Therefore
s1(1/4) =

1 p0 < 7/9
y p0 = 7/9
0 p0 > 7/9
Hence (s1(1/4), s2(θ2)) is a sub-game perfect equilibrium for the DG. We now see that, depending
on its belief about agent 2, agent 1 can send any amount of money to agent 2 and agent 2 can
return different amounts of money as an optimal solution for the Trust DG.
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6 Other proofs, results and examples
In this section, we first provide the proofs of the two lemmas in the paper and then indicate how
multi-games can be employed to model production in multi-markets.
6.1 Proofs of the two lemmas
Lemma1 If an own-type-linear Bayesian game G is type-regular on V × {θ−i} for a given i ∈ I
and θ−i ∈ Θ−i, then it is type-regular on Θi × {θ−i}.
Proof. By Theorem 1, G is equivalent with a multi-game. Thus, we can assume G is a type-regular
multi-game on V × {θ−i} and therefore there exists a map σ∗i (·) : V → ∆(Ai) and σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i)
such that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the strategy profile (σ∗i (vj), σ−i) is a NE for the local game G(vj ,θ−i).
Thus, σ∗i (vj) is a probability distribution on Ai with
∑
ai∈Ai σ
∗
i (vj)(ai) = 1. We extend the map
σ∗i to a map σ∗i (·) : Θi → ∆(Ai) by σ∗i (θi) =
∑m
j=1 θijσ
∗
i (vj) where θi = (θi1, . . . , θim)
t. Since
∑
ai∈Ai
( m∑
j=1
θijσ
∗
i (vj)
)
(ai) =
∑
ai∈Ai
m∑
j=1
θijσ
∗
i (vj)(ai) =
m∑
j=1
θij
∑
ai∈Ai
σ∗i (vj)(ai) =
m∑
j=1
θij = 1
the map σ∗i (·) is well-defined. We claim that the strategy profile (σ∗1(θ1), . . . , σ∗n(θn)) is a NE for
the local game G(θi,θ−i) for θi ∈ Θi. We have
ui
(
σ∗i (θi), σ−i, θi, θ−i
)
=
m∑
j=1
θijui
(
σ∗i (vj), σ−i, θi, θ−i
)
=
m∑
j=1
θij
m∑
j=1
θijuij
(
σ∗i (vj), σ−i
)
=
m∑
j=1
θij
m∑
j=1
θijui
(
σ∗i (vj), σ−i, vj , θ−i
)
Since the strategy profile (σ∗i (vj), σ−i) is a NE for the local game G(vj ,θ−i), it follows that
ui
(
σ∗i (vj), σ−i, vj , θ−i
) ≥ ui(σi, σ−i, vj , θ−i)
for any given σi ∈ ∆(Ai) which yields:
ui
(
σ∗i (θi), σ−i, θi, θ−i
)
≥
m∑
j=1
θij
m∑
j=1
θijui(σi, σ−i, vj , θ−i) =
m∑
j=1
θijui(σi, σ−i, θi, θ−i)
= ui
( m∑
j=1
θijσi, σ−i, θi, θ−i
)
= ui(σi, σ−i, θi, θ−i)
Hence
(
σ∗i (θi), σ−i
)
is a NE for G(θi,θ−i) for each θi ∈ Θi, i.e., G is type-regular on Θi × {θ−i}. 
Lemma 2 If an own-type-linear Bayesian game G is type-regular on V n, then G is type-regular on
the boundary set
⋃
i∈I Θi × V n−1.
Proof. Suppose G is type-regular on V n with a map σ∗i (·) : V → ∆(Ai) for each i ∈ I such that
(σ∗1(vj1), . . . , σ∗n(vjn)) is a NE for the local game G(vj1 ,...,vjn ) where 1 ≤ ji ≤ m and i ∈ I. By
Corollary 2, σ∗i (·) can be extended to σ∗i (·) : Θi → ∆(Ai) such that(
σ∗1(vj1), . . . , σ
∗
i−1(vji−1), σ∗i (θi), σ
∗
i+1(vji+1), . . . , σ
∗
n(vjn)
)
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a1 a2
a1 (a, a) (b, c)
a1 (c, b) (d, d)
a1 a2
a1 (e, e) (f, g)
a2 (g, f) (h, h)
Table 2: Payoff matrices for G1 and G2 in Proposition 1.
u v
s (a1, a2) (b1, b2)
t (c1, c2) (d1, d2)
u v
s (e1, e2) (f1, f2)
t (g1, g2) (h1, h2)
Table 3: Payoff matrices for G1 and G2 in Proposition 2.
is a NE for the local game G(vj1 ,...,vji−1 ,θi,vji+1 ,...,...,vjn ), for all θi ∈ Θi, 1 ≤ jt ≤ m and t 6= i. Since
the map σ∗i (·) is independent of θ−i ∈ Θ−i, it follows that G is type-regular on
⋃
i∈I Θi×V n−1. 
6.2 Type-regularity in Double Games
In the following, we discuss on 2-agent DG with symmetric games [13] to find conditions on type-
regularity on extreme types with pure NEs. Assume that pure action profiles (s1, s2) and (s
′
1, s
′
2)
are NEs for G1 and G2 respectively. There are 16 possible cases which are can be summarized in
four cases where s1 = s
′
1 and s2 = s
′
2, or s1 = s
′
1 and s2 6= s′2, or s1 6= s′1 and s2 = s′2, ors1 6= s′1
and s2 6= s′2. For each case, a few conditions are needed to ensure type-regularity on {0, 1}2. The
following result, which can be proved by a simple computation, provides the necessary and sufficient
conditions for type-regularity on {0, 1}2.
Proposition 1. Let G be a DG with symmetric games G1 and G2 and payoff matrices in Table 3.
Then G is type-regular on {0, 1}2 with witness of type-regularity based on NEs of G1 and G2 if and
only if one of the conditions listed in the following table holds.
NE for G1 NE for G2 Conditions
(a1, a1) (a1, a1) a > c and e > g
(a1, a1) (a1, a2) a > c, b > d, e = g and f > h
(a1, a1) (a2, a1) a > c, b > d, e = g and f > h
(a1, a1) (a2, a2) a > c, b > d, g > e and h > f
A similar result can be deduced when G1 and G2 are not symmetric but there will be more
conditions. For instance, we have the following.
Proposition 2. Suppose G is a DG with basic games G1 and G2 whose payoff matrices are depicted
in Table 3. The strategy profiles (s, u) and (t, v) are NEs for G1 and G2 which induce type-regularity
on {0, 1}2 if and only if a1 ≥ c1, h1 ≥ f1, b1 ≥ d1, g1 ≥ e1, a2 ≥ b2, h2 ≥ g2, f2 ≥ e2 and c2 ≥ d2
In the follwing example, basic games are considered parametrized coordination games in [14, p.
2].
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a1 a2
a1 (x, x) (x, 0)
a2 (0, x) (y, y)
a1 a2
a1 (z, z) (z, 0)
a2 (0, z) (w,w)
Table 4: Payoff matrices for G1 and G2 of Example 1.
s1 s2 s3
s1 (3, 4) (6, 3) (7, 1)
s2 (2, 5) (3, 2) (5, 3)
s3 (1, 3) (0, 2) (3, 0)
s1 s2 s3
s1 (0, 4) (0, 8) (1, 1)
s2 (6, 1) (4, 5) (7, 3)
s3 (0, 1) (1, 6) (1, 3)
s1 s2 s3
s1 (1, 0) (1, 2) (4, 5)
s2 (0, 1) (3, 2) (3, 4)
s3 (2, 4) (5, 3) (6, 7)
Table 5: Payoff matrices for markets M1, M2 and M3.
Example 1. Let G be a DG whose basic games are coordination games with non-negative utilities
as depicted in Table 4. The strategy profile (a1, a1) is a NE for G1 and G2. By Theorem 3, G is
type-regular. In addition, by Corollary 2, the constant strategy map profile (s1(·), s2(·)) is a pure
BNE for G where si(·) : [0, 1]→ {a1, a2} for i = 1, 2 given by si(θi) = a1.
6.3 Production in multi-markets
Consider n multinational companies which compete in multi-markets consisting of, say, m different
markets each with its own rate of return. Assume that in each market j ∈ J = {1, . . . ,m} a given
product sj yields the greatest return but due to the design and manufacturing costs each company
has to mroduce the same product in all the m markets, named M1, . . . ,Mm. In this way, we have a
multi-game with Ai = {sj : j ∈ J} for all i ∈ I where θij is the investment fraction of company i in
market j. In addition, the total payoff is reduced to the convex combination of the individual payoff
for each market weighted by the rate of investment for that market. We give a numerical example.
We model the competition of two firms in three markets with multi-game such that payoff matrices
for agents in each market are shown in Table 5 with Θi = Σ
2 for each firm i = 1, 2. It is easy to
check that σ∗i (·) : V → ∆(Ai) given by σ∗1(vj) = sj for j = 1, 2, 3 is a witness of type-regularity
G on V . By Corollary 3, G is type-regular with type-regularity witness σ∗i (·) : Θi → ∆(Ai) with
σ∗i (θi) =
∑m
j=1 θijσ
∗
i (vj). Theorem 1 implies (σ
∗
1(·), σ∗1(·)) is a BNE for all prior.
7 Conclusion
We have developed the notion of type-regularity for Bayesian games which represents a necessary
and sufficient condition for a Bayesian game to have a BNE independent of all priors. We have
then shown that an m-dimensional n-agent Bayesian game in which each agent’s utility is linearly
dependent on the agent’s type, is equivalent to a multi-game, i.e., a simultaneous competition by
the agents in m basic n-agent games. This result is also extended to generalised multi-games that
are equivalent to Bayesian games, in which each agent’s utility depends linearly on all agents’
types. We have then proven that an own-type-linear Bayesian game is type-regular if and only if its
equivalent multi-game is type-regular on the vertices of the (m − 1)-dimensional simplex, a result
which is used in different contexts to construct prior independent BNE.
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We can employ multi-games to model decision making by agents investing with their individual
weights in multiple environments or markets that are considered as basic games. Multi-games are
also proposed as a way to model human rational-social decision making. In particular, we have
constructed a type-regular DG for the PD and a prior dependent perfect subgame NE for a DG
based on the Trust game to account for the prosocial component in human decision making.
Here are a number of challenges and questions for further work: (i) type-regularity for type-
linear Bayesian games, (ii) type-regularity for Bayesian games with piece-wise linear utilities, (iii)
multi-games based on basic games with incomplete information, (iv) Bayesian network games, (v)
existence and construction of regular pure BNE, (vi) further applications of linear-type Bayesian
games.
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